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A Perfect Storm on the Sea of Doubt:
Physicians, Professionalism and Antitrust
Thomas L. Greaney*
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking,
as we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for
determining the unreasonablenessof restraintsof trade, have set sail on a
sea of doubt, and have assumed power to say, in respect to contracts which
have no other purpose and no other considerationon either side than the
mutual restraintof the parties, how much restraintof competition is in the
public interest, and how much is not. The manifest danger in the
administrationofjustice according to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate
a standardwould seem to be a strong reason against adopting it.
Judge William H. Taft, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.1
The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been
so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the
principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least
quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one....[T]here is generally no
categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an
intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that callfor
more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for
the case....
2
Justice Souter, CaliforniaDental Ass'n v. FTC

I. Introduction
Judge Taft's eloquent warning about an unstructured antitrust
jurisprudence has strong resonance today. Courts have steadily
expanded the range of cases involving purported restraints of trade
* Professor

of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint
Louis University School of Law.
2

85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aft d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999).
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under the rule of reason that require proof of the actual effects and
have insisted on greater precision in the factual findings necessary to
support plaintiffs' burden. While shortcuts, such as truncated or
"quick look" inquiries, are theoretically possible in certain
circumstances, antitrust doctrine has not succeeded in simplifying or
clarifying its inquiries. As Justice Souter's less eloquent framing
reveals, the Supreme Court has recently muddied the water with a
highly imprecise formulation of what is required in such
investigations. For cases involving alleged restraints of trade by
physicians, a number of other factors complicate the enterprise even
further. Appreciation of the special character of professional services
and the imperfect nature of the health care marketplace raise thorny
issues for applying antitrust law to collective activities by physicians.
Looking beyond legal doctrine, one finds political and social crosscurrents that may dampen judicial enthusiasm to adhere to antitrust
strictures. This essay describes these factors and explores several
alternative paths to achieving a workable antitrust regime for
professional restraints of trade.

II. Professional Restraints: From Goldfarb to California
Dental
A. Goldfarb
Trade restraints by professionals have been a subject of close
scrutiny from courts and antitrust enforcers for almost thirty years.
Following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,4 the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or
"Commission") and Department of Justice challenged a variety of
ethical codes prohibiting advertising, contracting and affiliation with
HMOs, and affiliation with alternative care providers. Federal
enforcers also prosecuted dozens of private physician boycotts that
sought to deter innovative financing plans, block competition from
alternative care providers, or organize collective bidding. 5 Though
Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 391, 394-95 (2000); Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 775-76 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 16 (1984).
4 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
3

5 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), affd as modified,
638 F.2d
443 (2nd Cir. 1980), affd by equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 676 (1982); U.S. v.
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defendants often justified their actions as attempts to ensure provision
of high quality health care or to prevent "unprofessional" behaviors,
the government was never pressed to prove its case under the
exacting standards of the rule of reason. 6 Moreover, while disposing
of the claim that professionals enjoyed an exemption from the
antitrust laws by reason of their status as a "learned profession," the
Goldfarb opinion nevertheless, in Footnote 17, suggested that judicial
deference may sometimes be appropriate:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of
professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly
be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.7
Despite the apparent room it left for courts to consider
benefits other than increased competition under the rule of reason,
Footnote 17 has not played an important role in antitrust decisions.
The Supreme Court itself has declined to apply the concept to
professional restraints in a number of instances and lower courts
have rarely invoked it.9 Unfortunately, in California Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, the Supreme Court reopened the Pandora's Box of Footnote 17
with all its inherent ambiguities and with no metric to guide its
N.D. Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Mich. State Med. Soc'y, 101
F.T.C. 191 (1983). See generally B. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §14-10 (2000).
6 The FTC and Department of Justice settled virtually all cases involving
professional restraints of trade. Of the handful of private suits challenging ethical
norms, only Wilk, discussed infra note 30, produced a substantial judicial opinion.
7 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
8 See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. U.S, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Am.
Ass'n of Mech. Eng'rs Inc. v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556 (1982). In cases involving
naked restraints of trade among professionals, the Court once specifically rejected
the invocation of Footnote 17 to support rule of reason treatment, Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), and twice did not mention it,
FTC v. Ind. Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986); FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
9 The notable exception is Wilk, discussed infra note 30.
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application.
A second aspect of antitrust analyses of collaborative
invocation of
activities by professionals is defendants'
procompetitive benefits flowing from improved quality, enhanced
information flows, or correction of market failures. The Supreme
Court has dealt summarily with arguments that a "naked" restraint
may escape sanction based on its propensity to improve quality. In
National Society of Professional Engineers, it treated claims that
anticompetitive professional rules were necessary to assure an
appropriate level of safety as tantamount to a rejection of national
competition policy.' 0 At the same time, it has not foreclosed the
possibility that improving the workings of an imperfect market might
make a restraint "less naked" and that such propensities should be
considered when undertaking the balancing mandated under the rule
of reason. 1 In circumstances where benefits from collective
professional actions were clear, such as those that make valuable
information available to consumers, lower courts have repeatedly
relied upon improvements in market performance to uphold such
arrangements. 12 Not only are these interpretations well founded
conceptually and consistent with the consensus core of antitrust
doctrine, but as Clark Havighurst has noted, they serve the pragmatic
purpose of answering critics who find excessive attempts to enforce
competition policies that lessen, however slightly, the role of
professional discretion. 13 This accommodation worked well and
served antitrust's efficiency goals as long as the border between
naked and ancillary restraints was observed by the courts.

'0 435 U.S. at 695-96; see also Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 462.
" See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696 ("[B]y their nature
professional services may differ significantly from other business services and
accordingly the nature of competition in such services may vary. Ethical norms
may serve to regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of
Reason."). See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure
Defenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REv. 605 (1989)
[hereinafter Market FailureDefenses].
12 See e.g., Koefoot v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 977 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.
1992); Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Poindexter v. Am. Bd. of Surgery Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
13 Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust
Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 939, 948 (2001) (defenses may "protect
the law and its enforcers against the charge of being driven by a blind faith in
competition and market forces .... ).
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California Dental Association: Doctrinal Uncertainty and
Dubious Economics

B.

California Dental Ass'n v. FTC involved the Commission's
challenge to the rules of a private trade association restricting price
and "nonprice" advertising by its members. Although on their face
the challenged rules purported to control false and misleading
advertising, the evidence showed they had been used to condemn
many instances of truthful, non-deceptive advertising.' 4 The
Commission applied the per se rule to condemn the restrictions on
price advertising (though it did rule in the alternative that the rule
would also fail under an abbreviated analysis). Applying "quick
look" scrutiny, it also struck down the nonprice restraints, finding
that the association possessed5 market power and that the restraints
had an anticompetitive effect. '
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Commission's
decision, but declined to apply per se analysis to the price advertising
rule. 16 Instead it opted for an "abbreviated rule of reason" analysis
that did not engage in detailed analysis of the market or discuss
arguments premised on economic literature suggesting that
advertising restrictions may sometimes be procompetitive in the
professional context. 17 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to
the Ninth Circuit, concluding that per se analysis
18 was inappropriate
and that a "more sedulous" inquiry was required.
The controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's recent
decision in CaliforniaDental stems less from the Court's holding that
per se or the severely truncated standard was inappropriate to assess
the economic effects of the specific professional restraints at issue,
than its blurring of prior doctrine. The unfavorable commentary
concerning the decision has criticized the majority opinion's failure
to explicate the structure of analysis under the rule of reason; its
casual examination of the economic justifications relied upon to
14 See In re Cal. Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 252 (1996) (concluding that

the Ass'n had challenged hundreds of representations that on their face were not
false or deceptive). A dissenting Commissioner would have remanded the case for
further findings. Id. at 333 (Azcuenaga, J., dissenting).
'5
16

Id. at 252.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526

U.S. 756 (1999).
17 Cal. DentalAss'n, 128 F.3d at 727-28.
18

526 U.S. at 781.

486

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 481

-reject truncated scrutiny; its failure to give deference to the FTC's
findings; and its misapprehension of the appropriate measure of
"output" in the context of restraints upon services. 19 These defects
give rise to three central areas of concern for future antitrust inquiries
involving professionals.
1. What Role for Professional and Quality of Care
Justifications?
Emphasizing information failure in the market for dental
services, the Court insisted that a more complete examination was
required for restrictions whose stated purpose was to limit deceptive
advertising. Citing Footnote 17 of Goldfarb, the Court stated:
[T]he [California Dental Association's] advertising
restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition. The restrictions on both discount and
nondiscount advertising are, at least on their face, designed
to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market
characterized by striking disparities between 2the
1
information available to the professional and the patient.
Justice Souter went on to note a number of other special
characteristics of the market for dental services, including the fact
that information about prices and availability is "difficult to get and
verify;, 22 the existence of "striking disparities between the
' 23 and that
information
to the services
professional
the patient;
"the quality available
of professional
tendsand
to resist
either calibration
19

See, e.g.,

Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitor CollaborationAfter California

Dental Association, 2000 U. CH. LEGAL F. 149; David Balto, Some Observations

on California Dental Association v. FTC, 14

ANTITRUST,

Fall 1999; Stephen

Calkins, CaliforniaDental Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty,

67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000); Marina Lao, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal
Restraints Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499 (2001); Thomas L.
Greaney, Antitrust and the Healthcare Industry: The View from the Three

Branches, 32 J. HEALTH L. 391, 392-97 (1999). For a more favorable assessment,
see William J. Kolasky, California Dental Association v. FTC: The New Antitrust
Empiricism, ANTITRUST, Fall 1999.
20 Cal. DentalAss'n, 526 U.S. at 780-81.
21

Id. at 772.

22

Id.

23 Id. at 771.
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or monitoring by individual patients or clients. ' 24 Further, the Court
offered the confusing observation that "[p]atients' attachment to
particular professionals, the rationality
2 of which is difficult to assess,
complicate the picture even further."
The invocation of Footnote 17 and the Court's repeated
references to market imperfections raises anew the question of
whether special treatment will be afforded to professional activities.
While there are several textual signals that the Court did not mean to
upset entirely its prior treatments of learned professions or of qualitypremised justifications, the majority opinion gives an unmistakable
nod to claims that peculiarities of health care markets justify close
consideration. Not only were special circumstances observed (and
framed rather dogmatically), but the decision gave almost no
deference to the FITC's specific findings about the market.
Information deficits will be present (albeit in different degrees) in
most cases involving health professionals. Unfortunately, trial courts
will obtain no guidance from California Dental as to when those
problems justify broad rule of reason treatment or when truncated
review is "meet for the case."
Equally problematic is the fact that the California Dental
majority opinion blends its treatment of professionalism and market
imperfection considerations in a way that is certain to invite future
litigants to insist on broad rule of reason inquiries whenever either is
present. Close analysis of the Supreme Court's cases in this area
would suggest that full-scale inquiries into suspect restraints are
appropriate only when professional judgments seem well-suited and
are reasonably necessary to ameliorate significant problems. In this
connection, it is important to note that the CaliforniaDental opinion
did not attempt to distinguish the market conditions at issue in FTC v.
Indiana Federationof Dentists, in which the Court summarily struck
down a restraint forbidding dentists from supplying to third party
payors x-rays needed to review the appropriateness of claims.2 ' This
24

Id. at 772.

Id. The Court made no effort to explain why patient loyalty to physicians
might be regarded as irrational. The comment betrays the majority's failure to
appreciate the important role that trust plays in correcting market failures in
medicine. See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertaintyand the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963); Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26 J.
HEALTH PO., POL'Y & L. 1131 (2001).
26 Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 463 (rejecting as "flawed both legally
and factually" justifications based on the claim that "consumers are given access to
information they believe to be relevant to their choices will... make unwise and
25
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suggests that it did not mean to upset entirely that decision's
insistence that defendants adduce evidence of procompetitive effects
and not rest on generalized assertions of imperfect market conditions.
Moreover, a key difference between the two cases was that the
restraint in Indiana Federationof Dentists interfered directly with the
market mechanism (utilization review) that ameliorated significant
market imperfections, including moral hazard, associated with third
party insurance. To that extent, Indiana Federation of Dentists
involved a more serious restraint than advertising restrictions, whose
effect on the pricing mechanism is less direct.
At the same time, however, the California Dental majority
did not delve deeply into the logic or the mechanisms by which
information deficits would be cured by significant bans on the
provision of price and nonprice information. Inasmuch as advertising
at first blush seems aimed at correcting market failure by enhancing
the stock of information available to buyers, this is a critical lapse.
Without first requiring that defendants demonstrate more than what
Justice Breyer referred to as "theoretical plausibility," 27 defendants
will have little difficulty in contending that market imperfections
require full rule of reason treatment no matter how suspect their
concerted activity and without regard to the existence of plainly less
restrictive alternatives.
One notable, but flawed, attempt to craft a process under the
rule of reason for addressing ethical and quality issues is found in
Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n. 28 At issue were the AMA's ethical
prohibitions against physician referrals and other forms of
cooperation with chiropractors that it claimed advanced the
profession's purposes of advancing scientific knowledge and
improving quality of care. The Seventh Circuit responded with a
"special" rule of reason (also termed a "patient care defense"). The
decision announced a four-part test that afforded defendant the
opportunity to demonstrate a dominant, "objectively reasonable"
concern for issues going to the "scientific method" underlying the
care given to patients; where those criteria were satisfied, the test
further required defendant to demonstrate that less restrictive means
29
of
policing test.
quality
were notbenefits
available.
proved
to be ona
demanding
In assessing
under This
the rule
of reason

even dangerous choices.").
27

Cal. DentalAss'n, 526 U.S. at 787.

28

719 F.2d 207 (7thCir. 1983).

29 Id.

at 227.
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remand, the trial court rejected as speculative the AMA's claim that
procompetitive informational benefits flowed from the boycott
(which the AMA characterized as "nonverbal communication" about
differences in quality of care provided by chiropractors).3 °
Essentially, the defendants argued that rules prohibiting cooperation
signaled important facts and professional judgments about
chiropractors, and thus improved medical doctors' competitiveness
by allowing them to act on the basis of better information. In
principle, certain collective actions by professional associations may
improve competition by overcoming market imperfections in
information about providers and the quality of care they supply.
However, the court was entirely correct in rejecting this alleged
benefit on the record before it. Given that the AMA's absolute
boycott was designed to destroy chiropractic practice, a far more
compelling showing of the nature and magnitude of these benefits
and the absence of less restrictive alternatives should be required to
overcome such restraints.
There are several reasons to question the wisdom of the
Seventh Circuit's "patient care defense." For example, by blending
subjective and objective standards, it invites an open-ended inquiry
into scientific issues and motives that may confuse both judges and
juries. Moreover, as discussed below, by failing to clearly delineate
market failure as a justification for a departure from ordinary antitrust
analysis, the approach invites considerations of "worthy objectives"
and quality of service justifications that the Supreme Court has
decisively rejected. Nevertheless, the approach is instructive in that it
attempts to rigorously structure the rule of reason inquiry and
appropriately puts those who assert defenses predicated on the
peculiarities of health markets to the exacting 3tests
of empirical proof
1
and a less restrictive alternatives requirement.
2. What is the Appropriate Measure of Output in Cases
Involving Restraints of Trade by Professionals?
Apparently believing the only measure of output in the case to
be dental services, the California Dental majority termed "puzzling"
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Association's advertising
restrictions reduced output in the provision of information. 32 It went

30

Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

31

See infra section IV.

32

526 U.S. at 776.
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on to question whether any restriction on demand was cognizable:
If quality advertising actually induces some patients to
obtain more care than they would in its absence, then
restricting such advertising would reduce the demand for
dental services, not the supply; and it is of course the
producers' supply that is normally relevant in determining
whether a producer-imposed output limitation has the
anticompetitive effect of artificially raising prices.3 3
The Court's implication that an informational service
component (such as advertising) could not be regarded as a part of
the output of the professional services rendered is incorrect. As an
economic matter, the lessening of output in information can
effectively injure consumers; moreover, it can do so without
necessarily reducing output in the market for dental services.
Properly viewed, dental consumers are purchasing a package of
service and information about those services which make them more
satisfied with the treatment, value, and care they receive. 34 The FTC
had rehearsed this issue previously in a case involving 5a collective
agreement by auto dealers to limit showroom hours. 3 The Sixth
Circuit found the Commissioner's characterization of the restriction
as a per se restraint as inappropriate, viewing the output of the
dealers as car sales exclusively. 36 The Sixth Circuit's narrow
interpretation of the market seems plainly at odds with the Supreme
Court's treatment of a similar
service aspect of competition in
37
Indiana Federationof Dentists.
33 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 776-77.
34 Professor Hovenkamp analyzed the court's error as follows:

The "output" of any firm is. the combination of product-plus-otherservices that the market produces. Thus the output of the car dealer is
car transactions, its desirable showroom and hours of operation, and its
advertising. An agreement among dealers not to have showrooms
reduces costs and may or may not result in greater cars sales. But we
attach significance to the fact that consumers value the showroom;
otherwise a well-functioning competitive market would not have
produced it.
Hovenkamp, supra note 19, at 174.
35 Detroit Auto Dealers, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), affid, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.
1992).
36 Detroit Auto Dealers v. FTC, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992).
37 Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 453 ("A refusal to compete with respect
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Equally problematic is the Court's broadly dismissive
treatment of demand-side effects. Restraints operating on the demand
side may have adverse competitive consequences under certain
conditions. 38 Admittedly, it is necessary to distinguish efforts to spur
demand that may be quality-improving or information generating as
to a given product from tactics that artificially increase demand for
one product at the expense of another. In California Dental, the
essence of the demand-side claim was that the ban on advertising
exacerbated market failure resulting from informational deficits.
Some who might otherwise forego treatment might seek dental
services in response to price or quality advertising. 39 The output
restriction resulting from collusive agreements to dampen demand
should be cognizable when it exploits or extends market failures.
Unfortunately, on remand, the Ninth Circuit read the Supreme
Court's admonition broadly
and treated this claim as beyond the
40
scope of antitrust law.
3. How will Courts Evaluate Economic Evidence?
The courts' handling of the economic evidence in California
Dental is a cause for concern. Both the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals overreacted to some rather broad economic
generalizations. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's evaluation of the
empirical evidence before it seemed to lose sight of the purpose and
limitations of economic studies of particular markets.
For purposes of evaluating the economic effects of the
advertising restraints, the record in the CaliforniaDental case was far
from satisfactory. Because the trial staff elected to proceed on a per
se theory, it did not call an expert economic witness and did not
to the package of services offered to customers, no less than a refusal to compete
with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to
advance social welfare ... ").
38 See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing
Practicesin Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (1997) (explaining that demandincreasing agreements like coercion and deception may adversely affect consumer
welfare where the practice imposes costs on buyers of some other product).
39 See Cox & S. Foster, The Costs and Benefits of OccupationalRegulation,
F.T.C. BUREAU OF EcONOMICS, Oct. 1990, at 35-36.
40 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 224 F.3d at 952. The Ninth Circuit rejected the FTC's
argument that in observing that supply effects are "normally relevant" to
anticompetitive price increases, the Supreme Court had not ruled out consideration
of demand-side effects. See Supplemental Brief of Federal Trade Commission in
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC at 30 n.9.
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assemble a comprehensive account of the economic literature.
Perhaps encouraged by the Supreme Court majority's statement that
"[h]ad the Court of Appeals engaged in a painstaking discussion in a
league with Justice Breyer's... and had it confronted the
comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable
advertising, its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its
conclusion," the FTC on remand argued that the record was sufficient
41
to allow the court to evaluate the restraints under the rule of reason.
That said, both courts' handling of the evidence before them was
problematic.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on several propositions
found in theoretical economic literature. First, it noted that the
"information asymmetries" that distort health care markets may
impair the functioning of the market and may justify professional
interventions that protect consumers. While this may be true in some
circumstances, the Court neglected to note that the information
problems are a double-edged sword when evaluating professional
restraints. The same factors that impair consumers' capacity to
evaluate care and calculate value also enhance professionals' ability
to act opportunistically. Moreover, the Court gave no indication that
it understood that market imperfection is a matter of degree.
Inasmuch as all markets fall short of the neoclassical economist's
ideal, it is surely necessary to limit the categories of market defects
sufficient to trigger fuller analysis. For example, as a preliminary
criterion, the Court might have insisted that the defendant's claim
amounted to a claim of "market failure. ' 4 2 In this connection, it is
appropriate to insist that professional interventions be justified as the
least restrictive alternative to effectuating such improvements.43
41

It did argue that if the Ninth Circuit found the record did not support their

conclusion that the restraints were anticompetitive under the rule of reason the case
should be remanded to the Commission. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 224 F.3d at 958. The
Ninth Circuit held however that the FTC had made a tactical decision not to
introduce further empirical or expert economic evidence and was not entitled to "a
second bite at the apple"; it therefore declined to remand the case to the
Commission. Id. at 959.
42 See Hovenkamp, supra note 19, at 176 (defining market failure as
"situations where the unrestrained market is simply not doing an adequate job of
providing the correct quality or price of the services in question."). See also Market
FailureDefenses, supra note 11, at 633-41.
43 See Market Failure Defenses, supra note 11, at 645-649 (proposing a

structured market failure defense); Joseph Brodley, The Economic Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U.

L. REv. 1020, 1047-48 (1987) ("The existence of market failure indicates the need
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Secondly, the Court was impressed with the argument that
dental advertising may have the characteristics of a "lemons market."
Though it was less than clear on the point, possibly the Court meant
to rely on this contention as an indication that advertising threatened
to harm consumers. Relying on a well-known article by George
Akerlof, the Court observed that in some situations, dishonest
dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. 44 Yet the
lemons market frame can not support blanket conclusions about
professional advertising, nor should it, without more, be used to
justify abandoning abbreviated analysis of suspect restraints. First,
there is reason to doubt the extent of the phenomenon in dental
advertising: many dental advertising claims are verifiable and subject
to the testing common to experience goods.45 As economists have
pointed out, the risks of lemons markets are commonly dealt with by
both private market forces and government interventions. Guarantees
and warranties may counteract the effect of dishonest advertising, as
indeed may counter-advertising and independent sources such as
consumer newsletters.46 Moreover, government regulation of
deceptive advertising as well as legal interventions such as licensure
place some limits on extreme behaviors.
The Ninth Circuit's treatment of the empirical evidence
before it betrays a misapprehension of the evidentiary value of this
evidence. Indeed, by declining to draw inferences from these studies,
the court implicitly set an unwarranted standard for the proof of
effect based on empirical economic evidence. Having first concluded
that the nature of the association's restraints merited something
approaching a full-blown rule of reason analysis, 47 the Ninth Circuit

for regulation, but does not resolve whether the regulation should be public or

private.")
44 George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON 495 (1970). See also Hayne E. Leland, Quacks,
Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON
1328 (1979).
45 Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade
Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 265, 289 (2000)
(CaliforniaDental opinion "exaggerated the impact of adverse information").
46 Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring

ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Muris, supra note 45, at
289.
47 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 224 F.3d at 947 n.3 (court is "opt[ing] for a particularly
searching rule-of-reason inquiry in light of the plausibility and strength of the
procompetitive justifications" for the Associations advertising restraints).
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undertook a review of the economic record before it. Although a
number of studies indicated that price and nonprice advertising by
professionals improved consumer welfare without harming
consumers, 48 the Ninth Circuit was unjustifiably wary of drawing
inferences from those studies as to the likely effects of advertising
restraints by dentists. While the court observed that the authors of
these studies cautioned against extrapolating from their conclusions
without further research, the court's dismissive approach appears
unwarranted. Given the number of studies finding that advertising
restrictions tend to raise price and that professional advertising does
not impair quality,49 along with the Court's own pronouncements in
the area of professional advertising, 50 the Ninth Circuit's treatment of
the evidence seems inappropriate. In adopting a "particularly
searching" rule of reason standard, the court appears to have adopted
a heightened proof standard as well, one that sub silentio shifted to
the government the burden of disproving the presence of significant
market failure or that adopted a heightened evidentiary standard.

III. Politics and the Medical Profession
Another factor casting a shadow over antitrust enforcement
involving professional restraints of trade is the unmistakable shift in
attitude among judges and legislators regarding managed care.
Dissatisfaction with bureaucratic delays, interference with patient
choice of providers and other factors have encouraged a belief that
managed care has become too powerful. 51 This "backlash" against
managed care has resulted in extensive state regulation aimed at
curbing perceived abuses. It has also spurred efforts to "level the
playing field" between physicians and managed care organizations

48

See James A. Langenfeld & John R. Morris, Analyzing Agreements Among

Competitors: What Does the Future Hold?, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 651, 667 (1991)

(reviewing literature and concluding empirical "studies of the price effects of
advertising restrictions in professional occupations consistently have found that
restrictions raise price").
49 Id. An excellent review of the economic learning in this area is found in
Muris, supra note 45, at 293.
50 E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)
("[A]ssessment of the validity of legal advice and information contained in
attorneys' advertising is not necessarily a matter of great complexity.").
51 Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Care: Hard Politics

Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395 (2001); Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer
Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (2001).
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through legislation that would permit provider collaboration and bar
application of antitrust law. For example, two states have adopted
legislation designed to exempt physician collective bargaining from
coverage of state and federal antitrust laws 52 and a federal bill that
would permit such activities to come under labor exemption passed
the House of Representatives in 2000. 53 While the merits of this
debate are beyond the scope of this article, 54 it is worth noting that
these attitudes have been reflected in court decisions and the attitude
of government enforcers.
Courts are increasingly citing managed care's shortcomings,
reflected by Judge Posner's acerbic epigram that "the HMO's
incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you get very sick, and
are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical
expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as possible." 55 One
circuit court decision notably quoted the aforementioned passage in
support of its questionable interpretation of patients' decisions to
migrate to distant hospitals. 56 Moreover, federal enforcers have
shifted resources and prosecutions away from scrutiny of provider
markets, a move that can be explained at least in part by a growing
disinclination to pursue cases involving professional judgments.

52 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.06(a) (Vernon 2001); N.J. STAT. § 52:17B-196
(West 2002); see Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The UncertainFuture of

Competition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFFs. 185 (Mar./Apr. 2002)
[hereinafter Whither Antitrust].
53 146 CONG. REC. H5652 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (H.R. 1304 Quality Health

Care Coalition Act passed the House).
54 See Dionne Koller Fine, Exploitation of the Elite: A Case for Physician

Unionization, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 207 (2001); William S. Brewbaker, III,
Physician Unions and the Future of Competition in the Health Care Sector, 33 U.
C. DAVIS. L. REV. 545 (2000); FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 1073-75 (2001).
5 Marshfield Clinic v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d

1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995).
56 FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999). See
generally Whither Antitrust, supra note 52, at 186-88 (criticizing Tenet decision).
57 The Department of Justice recently announced plans to shift enforcement

responsibilities for health care matters to the FTC, an agency that has devoted the
lion's share of its enforcement efforts in recent years to the pharmaceutical
industry. See Senator Derails Reform Effort at Last Minute, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
2002, at El; Whither Antitrust, supra note 52, at 192-93.
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IV. Future Directions
This brief article has sought to identify some of the missteps
that have bred uncertainty and threaten to undermine sound economic
analysis of the impact of physician collaboration. A principal
shortcoming of the courts has been the abdication of their
responsibility to craft presumptions and rules that will guide
factfinders attempting to apply antitrust law against the confusing
backdrop of market imperfections and legitimate professional goals.
In the case of physician collaborations that restrain trade, care must
be taken to separate bare-boned justifications premised on worthy
objectives or enhancements to quality of care from those that
accurately depict market-improving mechanisms. To do so, I have
proposed elsewhere a "structured market failure defense" that
requires proof that market failure actually impairs market
performance, that professional self regulation is likely to improve
consumer welfare, and that less restrictive means of obtaining such
benefits are not available. 58 Much important scholarship, such as that
of Peter Hammer, has begun to focus attention on dissecting the
impact of trade restraints in the context of close analysis of the
functioning of imperfect health care markets. 59 While neither the
unpredictable political winds nor the shifting seas of Supreme Court
jurisprudence give much room for optimism, these markers may help
lower courts steer a course toward a more sensible jurisprudence in
this area.

Market FailureDefenses, supra note 11, at 645-49.
59 Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price
and Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 MICH. J. L. REF. 727 (1999);
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(2000). See also Cory S. Capps et al., The Silent Majority Fallacy of the ElzingaHogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers,
January 2001, available at http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/satterthwaite/

Research/2001%200131%20hospdemand-fallacy.pdf

(last visited Apr. 27, 2002).

James Langenfeld & W. Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46
ANTITRUST BULL. (2001); Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech, Critical Thinking
about 'CriticalLoss' in Antitrust, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 331 (2001).

